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Abstract
This article explores the decisive role of pension funds in the neoliberal restructuring 
of the Icelandic economy, arguing that, through their involvement in the pension-
fund industry, the labour unions contributed to laying the foundations for Iceland’s 
economic financialisation. The socioeconomic stability provided by the labour 
organisations was the crucial element upon which the new financial regime of 
accumulation relied, enhancing the national economic ‘credibility’ that helped the 
internal market to attract foreign speculators as well as gaining access to loans 
from international market. I begin by examining how the structural crisis of the 
Icelandic economy produced an explosion of inflation and industrial conflict in 
the late-1980s. I then retrace the way the implementation of a neo-corporatist 
pattern enabled lower inflation and stabilisation of the currency. Finally, I analyse 
the way in which the involvement of the Icelandic trade unions in the financial 
mechanisms through the pension industry generated a degree of identification 
with pro-market governmental policy on the part of union leaders, encouraging 
them to tailor their own strategies accordingly. My conclusion is that Icelandic 
unions’ consensus concerning the ‘stabilisation programme’ implemented by the 
neoliberal coalitions relies on their embeddedness into the financial structures of 
the national economy through occupational pension funds.
Keywords
Pension funds, financial expropriation, industrial relations, trade unions, 
political economy
Introduction
This article attempts to address the gap in the existing literature regarding the process of 
development in the institutions making Icelandic financialisation socially and politically 
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possible. By focusing on the development of the occupational pension funds, my goal is 
to retrace the macro-social and political foundations of the strategies and behaviours of 
economic actors during the building process of the financial architecture in Iceland since 
the early 1990s. In particular, this paper attempts to mount a challenge to conventional 
perspectives on the role labour organisations are normally conceived to play in the 
generation of national economic policy.
In a small market context such as Iceland’s, occupational pension funds are one of the 
most important players in the country’s financial markets (Jónsson, 1999: 32-35), closely 
integrated into private banking, the investment system, and industrial relations. Pension 
fund assets experienced an apparently endless growth, reaching an astonishing share of 
133 per cent of GDP at the end of 2007. They increased by more than twenty times in 
real terms from 1980 – the second highest increase among OECD countries, after the 
Netherlands. At the same time, workers retirement savings soared to 31 per cent of total 
domestic saving in 1997 (even higher than the bank savings share), providing a funda-
mental source of liquidity that underpinned the financial industry. The enormous 
importance of pension funds in the national economy makes trade union leaders, who 
control them in cooperation with the employers and ‘pension funds money managers’, 
very influential in the economic and political life of the country. As Ásmundur Stefánsson, 
the president of the Icelandic Federation of Labour (ASÍ) from 1980 to 1992, proudly 
declared, ‘ASÍ has broken away from political conflict and is now a leading force in the 
country, not the political parties. It is rather the political parties that seek assistance from 
ASÍ … It is no question that we have managed to regulate many things in the last years’ 
(Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 158).
Iceland’s peculiar development, therefore, makes it especially useful as a case study for 
analysing how markets do not automatically produce ‘the various prerequisites that are 
necessary for their implementation’ (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997: 434); or, to put the 
matter in another way, how the impressive expansion of financial activity was sustained 
by powerful extra-market forces. In general, this expansion has often been referred to as 
‘financialisation’, and identifies the building process of the ‘pattern of accumulation in 
which profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through 
trade and commodity production’ (Krippner, 2004: 14). The range of phenomena that 
gives concrete life to the concept of financialisation – from the deregulation of the finan-
cial sector to the rise of speculative investment associated with the re-emergence of the 
rentier – has shaped the pattern of accumulation in many capitalistic economies in the 
last twenty to thirty years. Although the extent to which these phenomena prevailed in 
one country as opposed to another has been quite uneven, there are five striking traits 
that characterise the new finance-led regime of accumulation:
1) The deregulation of financial markets, new technologies and financial innova-
tions leading to an increase of capital flows.
2) Increased profits of both financial and non-financial corporations that do not 
promote increased productive investment.
3) The ideological ascendancy of ‘shareholder value’ in guiding corporate governance.
4) Consumption expenditures become the driving force for growth as households 
gain improved access to credit.
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5) The penetration of finance into what we might call social and economic workers’ 
reproduction (Stockhammer, 2008; Fine, 2009).
The most influential theoretical perspectives that tackle the question of financialisa-
tion – from Marxism to post-Keynesians – legitimately focus on the first four points, i.e. 
the economic side. On one hand, by analysing its causes, they rightly trace the expansion 
of the financial sphere back to the stagnation of production in the mid-1970s. On the 
other, many scholars put considerable effort into describing the effects of the growth of 
finance, mainly focusing on poor economic performance compared to the previous 
period, the increasing instability of financialised economies, and so on. Without a doubt, 
these questions are at the heart of the matter, and are worthy of deep investigation. Yet 
by excluding the penetration of finance into social and economic workers’ reproduction, 
in which labour organisations are still heavily involved, the relationship between the two 
fundamental classes within capitalism is forced into the background, which ‘ignore[s] 
the impact of the envisioning institutions of power with which trade unions constantly 
interact’ (Hyman, 1975: 69). At worst, the working class’s withdrawal is seen in terms of 
trade union bureaucracy’s betrayal of member’s interests, materialised by unions leaders’ 
accommodating union behaviour to employers’ prerogatives. At best, labour organisa-
tions are simply considered as passive subjects, substantially weakened in their traditional 
form, by changes in the political sphere and the response to neoliberalism of the social-
democratic parties to which unions were historically linked (McIlroy and Daniels, 2009: 
7). The result is that, since social relations between classes are thrown out of the analysis, 
the institutional building process that supports financialisation is often interpreted either 
in terms of an agency problem or, at the other extreme, as an objective and impersonal 
path. In both cases, the fact that social relations determine institutions is overlooked 
because the former are the conditions of existence of the latter, in the sense that social 
relations transfer their contradictory social content to institutions (Carchedi, 2001: 7).
To focus on the infiltration of finance in social and economic workers’ reproduction 
might prove useful in order to throw light on the socio-political prerequisites underlying 
the new paradigm of accumulation centered on finance. Put another way, the goal is to 
reintegrate the class analysis in the academic discourse regarding the phenomena of 
financialisation. Two factors explain the decision to inquire into the financialisation of 
workers’ income. First, although taking different forms compared to past phases, the 
fuel that directly and indirectly drives capitalism in all its forms still flows from the 
very relationship between labour and capital, i.e. surplus value. As mentioned above, 
financialisation represents a profound shift away from direct investment in productive 
capacity, towards the open financial markets in which profitability can be temporarily 
boosted through speculative operations in the stock markets (Lucarelli, 2011: 113-115). 
In this process, the transformation of the future streams of income into marketable and 
traded assets in the form of equities or bonds (Vasudevan, 2009: 30) through privatisa-
tion of social provisions is strongly interrelated to the ascendancy of a finance-led regime 
of accumulation. In fact, the parallel process of public welfare retreat has meant that 
workers and their families have come to rely on the market for social provision such as 
pensions. In this way, they have been increasingly forced into the arms of the financial 
system, triggering massive flows of lendable money capital. Nevertheless, the incorporation 
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of financial markets into the process of welfare provision meant a shift away from the 
common strategy of exploiting labour into the production sphere, towards the short-
term strategy of extracting profit directly out of wages and salaries into the sphere of 
circulation. This movement of purchasing power between actors in the economy is what 
Lapavitsas named ‘financial expropriation’, because savings across society are pooled 
and transformed into loanable money capital from which interest can be earned. Thus 
financial markets expropriate workers’ savings. However, within the new financial 
domain, enterprise and workers are motivated by different goals. The former focuses on 
the expansion of exchange value (profits) by appropriating loanable money capital 
originating in wages. The latter, instead, focuses on obtaining use-values like pensions, 
seeking to secure their future consumption for tomorrow’s retirement (Lapavitsas, 2009).
Second, although it is undeniable that the disciplinary force of the financial markets 
is often at odds with labour wages as well as welfare state expansion, in many countries 
the trade unions constituted a fundamental actor in the definition and in the implemen-
tation of the macro and micro-policies underpinning the process of economic finan-
cialisation. While in some countries like the UK and the USA, the deflation road 
included a frontal attack on labour organisations, in some others, like Iceland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden or Ireland, it can safely be stated that trade unions became increas-
ingly ready to collaborate in the definition and the implementation of some macro-
economic policies, such as the privatisation of the social risk (Trampusch, 2006; Belfrage 
and Ryner, 2009; Baccaro and Howell, 2011: 545-547). In this framework, one of the 
crucial extra-market institutions that matters most in the social construction of financial 
markets is the occupational pension fund, which appears as a key component in forging 
a broader class alliance in favor of neoliberal restructuring (Duménil and Lévy, 2004: 
129). By redefining the power relationships in the national arena and within the firms, 
pension funds, on the one hand, constitute a central mediating mechanism between 
the financial markets of transnationally mobile capital, core reproductive functions of 
the welfare state, and everyday saving and consumption over the life cycle (Belfrage 
and Ryner, 2009: 258). On the other hand, they are a decisive device that interlinks the 
unions’, employers’ and government’s actions, embedding industrial relations in a 
financial economic context within domestic boundaries. These complex networks have 
generated a structure of social relations in which even trade unions, acting in what they 
perceive to be their own interests, can produce effects that may be quite different, 
perhaps even diametrically opposed, to what they intended (Cowan, 1987: 279). As the 
analysis of the Icelandic case reveals, this is the crux of the matter: labour union leaders 
find themselves on both sides of the negotiating table, since it is often the same people 
involved in collective bargaining who are also managing pension funds for workers in 
cooperation with the employers. On one hand, as workers’ representatives they are 
supposed to bargain for expansive ‘pro-labour’ policies, to their membership’s advantage. 
On the other, as members of a financial institution (pension fund), they became strongly 
connected to influential members of employers and financial communities in sustaining 
neoliberal measures to boost pension assets, to shareholders’ advantage.
The financialisation of the social and economic reproduction of the working class 
through the occupational pension industry has therefore, in this sense, come down to 
disputes over economic policy issues in which the different interests of labour and capital 
are at stake. As Keynes (2000) pointed out, within an industrial society, business and 
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labour tended to favour an expansionary and potentially inflationary alternative, in 
opposition to the financial interests that preferred a deflationary policy. By becoming 
integrated into the decision-making process of a financial institution, whose wealth is 
denominated in terms of money, the social compromise between labour and capital is 
redefined, having both material and objective reasons to strongly oppose inflation, and 
in the meantime, to agree with the opening of the market in order to find more profit-
able opportunities in which to invest. Arguably, the worker organisations involved in 
occupational pension funds management should not be considered as merely passive 
players during the phase of economic financialisation, but rather as fundamental players 
helping to secure a certain stability and predictability in [financial] accumulation – 
despite the fundamental contradictions and conflicts generated by the very dynamic of 
capitalism (Jessop, 2006: 4).
The redefinition of capital–labour-power relations and their recent fusion with 
financial institutions, as discussed above, suggest that conventional theoretical 
approaches to industrial relations suffer from certain explanatory limitations. Under 
industrial capitalism, power, for the capitalist class, is identical with capital’s command 
over labour both in workplaces and in the labour market. In the first place, capitalists 
and their agents have control over the process of production, and use their dominant 
position in capitalist society to compel workers to expend an extended period of effort 
at the workplace beyond what is required to make back their wages, which forms the 
basis for capitalist profit (Shaikh, 1986: 167). In the labour market, the complex and 
concrete (and shifting) categories incorporating the full range of socioeconomic rela-
tions, structures and tendencies (Fine, 2007: 128), mainly among employers, unions 
and the state, have tended to produce conditions that reinforce the stability of the 
exploitive capital–labour relation. The analysis of the process of control over work 
relations, i.e. the exploitation of surplus value in the sphere of production and its social 
preconditions and reflection in the labour market, has constituted the normal object of 
study in the industrial relations of industrial societies (Hyman, 1975).
To be clear, although the relationship between capital and labour has achieved greater 
obfuscation due to financialisation, industrial relations are no less crucial in regulating 
interrelations binding the two major classes in contemporary capitalism. As part 
and parcel of the historical forms of capitalism, industrial relations transform as new 
generalised structural imperatives emerge historically, which in the current period have 
centred around the search for profits in the sphere of circulation. The co-evolution of 
industrial relations with the financial institutions causes more or less radical institutional 
changes – depending on the extent of the changes in the pattern of alliances between 
social blocks and political actors (Amable et al., 2005: 372) – which, in turn, redefine the 
institutional complementarities among financial regulations, industrial relations, and 
political economic institutions. To grasp more completely the changed parameters 
structuring interaction between social actors, a deep aggiornamento in the study of the 
industrial relation is required. Financialisation has actually undermined the boundaries 
previously separating financial institutions, so that labour laws, collective bargaining and 
individual labour contracts are now shaped in significant ways by factors which used to 
be largely outside their conventional domain of investigation (Boyer, 1996: 21).
First, it is fundamental to determine how the transformation, due to the internation-
alisation of the financial market, has shifted the balance of power of various groups and 
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economic specialisations via the re-deployment of the strategies of the firms, the banks, 
the unions, the government and the state (Boyer, 1996: 5). Second, it is equally essential 
to highlight the level of embeddedness and/or the control of the industrial relations 
institutions of financial structures of the national economy.
Despite the importance of pension funds in relation to the size of Iceland’s economy, 
and the primary role of the national trade unions, to this date these theoretical and 
empirical insights have not been fully applied to analyse the social forces at the root of 
one of the most destructive examples of liberal capitalism: the Icelandic case. Many of 
the articles that have tried to inquire into the rise of Icelandic imbalances merely 
provide subjective or contingent explanations of the very causes behind the failure of 
Iceland’s financial system, such as the supposedly weak business culture of Icelandic 
society (Vaiman et al., 2011), the risky expansion strategies pursued by the banks 
(Carey, 2009), or the implementation of the neoliberal agenda by a new generation of 
young politicians that came to power in the 1990s (Benediktsdóttir et al., 2011). In a 
more complex version, the Icelandic crisis is the outcome of the interaction between 
policy and management errors, like the fiscal policy of the government, the monetary 
policy of the Central Bank of Iceland, and the financial supervision, corporate gover-
nance and risk management of the banks (Sigurjónsson and Mixa, 2011).
Unfortunately, the heterodox literature also seems to neglect Polanyian and 
Regulationist intuitions, causing it to fall into the trap of financial determinism. In their 
recent article, ‘Iceland’s meltdown: The rise and fall of international banking in the 
North Atlantic’, Robert Wade and Silla Sigurgeirsdóttir (2011), although providing a 
very convincing historical reconstruction of the fall of the Icelandic banking system, fail 
to keep the other promise in the article’s title, i.e. the explanation of the rise of the bank-
ing systems in Iceland. The reason is threefold. First, because of their adoption of a short-
period perspective, the authors neglect the structural conditions that are at the base of 
the reallocation of investments from production to speculative activities. In order to 
inquire into the upsurge of the Icelandic ‘international banking’, Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir 
limit themselves to exogenous factors, i.e. the Fed’s flood of liquidity on international 
markets, coupled with the ongoing process of the privatisation of the Icelandic banking 
system. The question of whether it is true that such interaction made foreign borrowing 
by Icelandic banks easier does not explain either the reason why Iceland privatised its 
banking system only at the dawn of the third millennium, nor what has pushed both the 
political and economic powers of Iceland to abandon their traditional support for the 
fishing sector in favor of the financial sector. Secondly, by laying the blame for the liberal 
turn in Iceland from the mid-1990s only on a greedy ‘shadow elite’, the authors exclude 
from their visual field another actor of no less importance, which provided the socioeco-
nomic stability necessary to enhance the national economic ‘credibility’ in order to attract 
foreign speculators in the internal market, and to gain access to loans by international 
markets (Screpanti, 2001); namely, the trade unions. Through their involvement in neo-
corporative pacts in the early 1990s, the workers’ organisations changed from being 
causes of ‘disorder’ into resources for political and social order, instrumental in lowering 
inflation and currency stabilisation. This in turn made an opening in the capital market 
possible, thus creating the necessary structural conditions for financial capital to erupt at 
the end of the decade. However, as a particular medium of regulating social relations, the 
monetarist criteria reinforced the risk that the trade unions’ strategies were subordinated 
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to purely monetary consideration. Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir simply rule out the function 
of the trade unions and their relationship with employers and the state in laying the 
material basis for the creation of the financial institutions that boosted the economy 
from the late-1990s. For them, the neoliberal wave that struck Iceland is solely attribut-
able to a ‘dozen or so men studying law or business administration at the University of 
Iceland’ during the 1970s, who refashioned society under a neoliberal model when they 
moved into positions of power (Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir, 2011: 59). The trouble with 
this approach, i.e. of relying exclusively on human behaviour, is that it does not substan-
tially depart from orthodoxy, where the economic crisis is explained in terms of human 
mistakes originating in inadequate regulative frameworks.
The under-theorisation of both the connection between the crisis of the primary 
sectors and the development of the banking sector, as well as the key role of trade 
unions in guaranteeing the social stability that was indispensable to the implementa-
tion of the monetary regime, leads to the third reason behind the breaking of the 
promise made by Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir. Being blind to these issues, in fact, does 
not excuse them from not taking into account the key institution that constitutes a 
central mediating mechanism between industrial restructuring and labour’s ‘forced 
consensus’ for the economic liberalisation and growth of the financial markets; 
namely, the occupational pension funds. In the first place, the pension funds’ admin-
istration tasks cast doubt on the hypothesis of a univocal shadow elite’s responsibility 
regarding the neoliberal turn. Indeed, the pension fund system, prior to the emergence 
of strong financial markets, served an indirect pedagogical function by training invest-
ment managers and providing challenging opportunities for young experts often edu-
cated abroad at major business schools. The opportunity to manage pension funds’ 
assets as well as the constant need for new financial products provided opportunities 
for a new generation of financial managers (Herbertsson, 2005; Portes et al., 2007). 
But what is more important is the fact that, as one of the largest savings institutions in 
the country, these funds not only benefited from the set of monetarist measures men-
tioned above, but also stimulated strong demand for new channels of speculative 
investment, ‘contributing significantly to the development of financial markets in 
Iceland’ (Guðmundsson, 2001: 2-20). During the latter half of the 1990s, the funds 
became more active on the domestic equity market as that market developed, and the 
funds were ‘increasingly looking for alternative investment opportunities to the domes-
tic bond market’ (Guðmundsson, 2001).
The preference for equities amongst pension funds in Iceland – which has contrib-
uted significantly to the growth of stock markets in the country (OECD, 2008: 65) – has 
deep historical and institutional roots. To begin with, the Icelandic pension system is one 
of the more privately oriented among the Nordic countries, and is closer in nature to the 
pension systems in the UK and USA (Ólafsson, 1999). In the Icelandic model, payments 
under public pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) regimes grounded in social citizenship rights and 
financed directly out of taxes are quite low by international standards.1 Over the last 
twenty years, the income testing of pensions has been increased and the development of 
public pension benefits have lagged behind wage levels in the labour market (Ólafsson, 
2001). In a sense, it appears that the expansion of occupational pensions provision has 
been linked to a decline in the value of pension schemes provided by the state (Evans, 
2009: 14).
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But while the PAYGO system does involve the direct and immediate transfer of 
money from one part to another part of the population, financial markets do not play a 
relevant role (Huffschmid, 2010: 244). The marginal role of this pillar within the 
Icelandic model means instead that financial markets play a key function in the accumu-
lation of funded provisions provided by the occupational pension pillars that dominate 
retirement provision in this country (OECD, 2008: 45).2 Workers’ dependence on 
money as a means of payment due to the retreatment of social provision in the field of 
pensions (Lapavitsas, 2009: 132) was strengthened by the agreement between the gov-
ernment and the public employees’ unions in 1997, and passed into law a few months 
later. From that moment on, all new state employees would become members of fully 
funded schemes with a similar system for accumulation of pension rights to that prevail-
ing on the private market (OECD, 1999: 109-111; Gudmundsson, 2001; Herbertsson, 
2005).
Indeed, the most significant deviation of the Icelandic pension system from that of 
other Nordic systems is the dominant role of occupational funded provisions as against 
common pay-as-you-go provisions based on assured or notional rights (Ólafsson, 1999; 
OECD, 2008: 44; NOSOSCO, 2010). The amount of pension benefits, in this system, 
depends on the performance of the financial markets, and means that the coverage of 
benefits to which workers are entitled is significantly shaped by the financial system. The 
regulation of occupational pension plans has played a key role in the development and 
the speculative direction of the Icelandic pension market. First, the fact that all wage 
earners and self-employed persons are obliged by law to subscribe to pension plans and 
to pay contributions to them helps to explain the exceptionally high coverage of occupa-
tional pension plans among the workforce in Iceland, which is over 90 per cent. This 
means that the pension market has benefited from disposable income revenue of virtu-
ally the entire employed labour force of Iceland. Second, the lack of a developed legal 
framework has given unions and employers complete control over pension funds, allow-
ing them to quickly change and bend rules and regulations according to their own ‘needs’ 
(Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 160). For some decades, while forcing workers to belong to and 
pay part of their income into funds, employers and trade unions could dispose of a con-
siderable amount of money, which was lent back to members in the form of mortgages.3 
With the crisis of the export-led regime of accumulation between the 1980s and 1990s, 
this investment strategy ceased to be sustainable. Due to that crisis, negative interest rates 
and the lack of profitable investment opportunities within the internal market were 
eroding the pension wealth of Icelandic workers. At that point, an agreement in 1995 
between ASÍ and SÍ quickly removed many limitations regarding domestic shareholding 
as well as foreign investment in their total net assets. This agreement was promptly 
absorbed by the government, which in 1997 and in the following years officially allowed 
pension funds to achieve the best return-risk composition available at any given time 
(Guðmundsson, 2001: 6). Pension funds were legally permitted to invest up to 50 per 
cent of their assets in foreign stocks (which could in theory be extended to 100 per cent 
if the investments were hedged back into the Icelandic króna), up to 60 per cent in equi-
ties listed on recognised and organised exchanges (with 10 per cent in unlisted securi-
ties). Finally, no ceilings on mortgage bonds were provided. These measures facilitated 
the shifting of the asset allocation of pension funds to corporate equities and risky bonds, 
at the expense of safe government assets or loans to members.
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Last but not least, the very typology of the Icelandic occupational pension funds 
appears to have played a crucial role in pushing such funds’ flow into speculative domes-
tic and foreign markets, delinking them from its roots in real activity. The bulk of 
Icelandic occupational pension plans operate much like defined contribution (DC) 
schemes, being fully funded through accumulated payments where the translation of 
units into benefits is adjusted according to investment returns – as usually happens in the 
neoliberal countries. This is at odds with Continental Europe and Scandinavian social 
democracies, where defined benefit (DB) plans are far more common (OECD, 2008). 
Table 1 shows the estimates of the relative share of assets and members in DB and DC 
pension plans in Scandinavia and in two paradigmatic cases in neoliberal countries, 
namely the UK and the USA. Contrary to other Scandinavian countries (except for 
Denmark), defined benefit private pension assets in Iceland as a percentage of total occu-
pational assets amounted only to 18 per cent in 2007, while more than 90 per cent of 
Icelandic employees belonged to such plans. At the end of 2007, 31 fully operational 
pension funds operated in Iceland, including 12 with employer guarantees from the state 
government, municipalities or banks. The remaining 19 funds, which cover the bulk of 
private-sector workers and public employees hired since 1998, are classified as DC.
Unlike DB plans, where the employer bears the risk that returns on investment may 
not be sufficient to meet guaranteed benefits, the DC system lacks any commitment to 
a set amount of benefits, meaning that participants bear the risk that returns from those 
funds will be sufficient to provide for their material well-being, security, and freedom in 
retirement. Employers’ release of the risk of entirely financing possible insolvency as well 
as the lack of a specified monthly benefit on retirement that is predetermined, pushed 
them to adopt investment strategies that were more and more speculative. If fund assets 
are insufficient to achieve the necessary income flows with lower-return safe investments 
such as Treasury or high-rated corporate bonds, to earn higher returns pension funds 
must increase risk (Crotty, 2008: 20). This explains why members of DC plans typically 
invest for their future through equity-based mutual funds, whilst whether they receive 
high or low incomes depends in part on financial market forces (Langley, 2008: 67-69). 
Table 1. Relative share of assets and members in DB- and DC-funded occupational 
pension plans
Country Assets Members
 DC Plans DB Plans DC Plans DB Plans
Iceland* 82 18 92 8
Denmark 97 3 50 50
Finland* 0 100 21 79
Netherlands 9 91 5 95
Norway* 0 100 n/a n/a
Sweden 5 95 50 50
U.K. 22 78 16 84
USA 35 65 70 30
Source. OECD Global Pension Statistics; * Indicates mandatory coverage.
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Given that the main difference with the pure DC system is that in Iceland participants 
share in the investment risk en masse rather than as individuals,4 the result is that not 
only people but also trade unions are encouraged to think of themselves as shareholders 
in the great capitalist bonanza, rather than as members of mutual organisations or as 
citizens (Mellor, 2010: 66).
As a consequence of flows of money capital into the national and international finan-
cial markets, the Icelandic occupational pension funds experienced inflation, which 
caused asset values to rise by an average of 17.9 per cent per year relative to GDP during 
the period 2001-07. The importance of pension funds for the domestic financial market 
is highlighted by the ratio of pension funds’ assets to market capitalisation. In Iceland, 
this ration equaled 152 per cent in 2003 – more than double that of three major liberal 
market economies, the USA (66 per cent), UK (65.7 per cent) and Australia (56.1 per 
cent), and significantly higher than in other Nordic countries – cf. Finland (7.9 per 
cent), Sweden (8 per cent) and Norway (10.7 per cent). The increase of pension funds’ 
size and depth within the national stock market is a central factor underlying the finan-
cialisation of the Icelandic economy. To illustrate this, Figures 1 and 2 compare Iceland 
with other Scandinavian countries. Figure 1 charts stock market capitalisation. Here, the 
dramatic rise in the value of financial assets and finance-based income as a percent of 
GDP in Iceland from the late 1990s becomes quite evident, jumping from 7.7 per cent 
in 1994, a value that was the lowest of the countries under consideration, to near 220 per 
cent in 2006, which was the highest. In turn, money incomes and money stocks have 
become a systematic source of financial profit (Lapavitsas, 2009). Figure 2 gives the share 
of financial profits to total corporate profits. While remaining more or less steady in the 
other Nordic economies, Iceland’s share has risen from just over 20 per cent in 1997 to 
a peak of 58 per cent in 2007.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The second section traces the 




























Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Figure 1. Financialisation of Scandinavian countries - Stock market capitalisation as 
% of GDP
Source. Author’s elaboration based on OECD dataset. 
Note. For Finland, the rise of market capitalisation to GDP in the late-1990s is chiefly due to Nokia, 
which had astonishingly high values in the period 1999-2001 (Allen et al., 2006: 95).
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accumulation regime. I then analyse trade unions’ involvement in a neo-corporatism 
pattern from the late-1980s on. Here, I examine how trade union cooperation with 
employers and the state was an essential condition to the defeat of the record conflic-
tuality (and thus the sky-high inflation) from the Icelandic socioeconomic environ-
ment, laying the foundations for the necessary institutions, which were capable of 
absorbing enormous masses of capital from the rest of the world. In the fourth section, 
I analyse the way the immersion of trade unions in financial mechanisms through the 
pension industry created a broad consensus around the ‘stabilisation programme’ 
accomplished by the neoliberal governments since the early 1990s. An examination of 
pension funds in the neoliberal compromise follows, where I discuss why the dual 
nature of the trade unions as a financial operator on the one hand, and as a working-
class organisation on the other, has become more and more difficult to conciliate. In 
the light of this finding, in the fifth section I finally investigate the use of the Icelandic 
workers’ pensions to rescue the national financial system after the banking meltdown 
in 2008.
I start from the assumption that economic structure firstly shapes the social, political 
and juridical over-structure. Then, the balance of power of social and political forces that 
arise from the direct relations of production strongly affects the reproduction and trans-
formation of the economy. In this connection, it is fundamental to determine how the 
led-export regime of accumulation’s crisis in the late-1980s interacted with the redefini-
tion of the labour–capital relations in which the capacity for economy and labour market 
regulations started to be highly dependent on the coordination between collective actors 
and the state. In this respect, choices and discretion on the part of labour, management 
and government affected the same course and structure of industrial relations systems 
(Kochan et al., 1984). But if the functionality of macro-economic governance did not 
determine the fate of industrial relations, then the structures of industrial relations them-






























Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Figure 2. Financialisation of Scandinavian countries - financial /total profits
Source. Author’s elaboration based on OECD dataset.
444 Capital & Class 36(3)
The roots of the financialisation of the Icelandic 
economy
From the early days of its industrialisation, Iceland’s development path was characterised 
by one-sided export specialisation and a fairly passive adjustment to international mar-
kets (Ólafsson, 1981; Magnússon, 1985; Jónsson, 1991, 2004). The great openness of 
the economy affected the role of exchange rates in the sense that throughout the postwar 
period, both the conservative and social-democrat governments repeatedly emphasised 
the devaluation of the currency as an anti-cyclical policy instrument to prevent the prof-
itability of its export industries, mainly in the fish sector,5 from being unduly eroded by 
inflation (Gylfason, 1990: 167).6 Besides preventing productivity growth in both the 
fishing and manufacturing sectors, this strategy made the economy extremely vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the resource-supply and foreign markets, causing huge variation in 
incomes and investment, and putting a strain on its macro-economic policy.
Since low productivity, inherent to the Icelandic model, required a very high level of 
labour utilisation (OECD, 1997: 103), the government had to conciliate two contradic-
tory goals: guaranteeing profits for fish exporters while maintaining full employment. In 
this regard, the method that the policy makers often adopted was to use both numerical 
and wage flexibility as a buffer against external shocks (Jónsson, 1991, 1995; Eðvarðsson, 
2003). As Figure 3 illustrates, during the period 1953-1989, real wages responded 
quickly to economic fluctuations, by increasing in the wake of favourable shocks – 
despite less than the GDP growth – and declining following adverse shocks – albeit 
much more than the GDP decrease. The result of this policy was that, while GDP out-
put and real wages had a volatile but pro-cyclical trend, real-wage flexibility has reduced 
the employment effect of macroeconomic shocks (Agnarsson et al., 1999: 17).7
The extreme volatility of the economy prior to 1990 greatly boosted social instability 
in Iceland due to the fact that employment relations were not isolated, but had to adapt 
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Figure 3. GDP and real wages - growth rates (1953 – 1989)
Source. Author’s elaboration based on Iceland Historical Statistics.
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systems of industrial relations – which are commonly associated with a very high regula-
tion potential – compromise between labour and capital in Iceland did not function 
because the same institutions could not protect it from pressures in the market (Líndal, 
1995; Magnússon, 1995; Dølvik, 2008). Different from other Nordic systems, devalua-
tions in Iceland took the form of national wage restraint and competitiveness, with-
out the need for neo-corporatist agreements (Kristjánsson, 1977; Jónsson, 1995; 
Guðmundsson and Kristinsson, 1997). However, after the devaluations, profits skyrock-
eted, while imported inflation eroded real wages. As economic conditions improved, 
strikes followed as wage earners tried to compensate for their losses (Mjøset, 2000). As 
Korpi and Shalev (1979: 186) pointed out, endemic conflictuality has characterised the 
Icelandic labour movement all along. By measuring the intensity of class struggle by 
thousands of working-days lost in strike activity, Table 2 shows how conflictuality in 
Iceland was historically much higher than that of other Nordic countries, averaging 
1309.7 working days lost during the period 1960-1979, almost fifty times higher than 
that of Sweden, more than twenty-five times more than in Norway, four-and-a-half 
times more than in Finland, and almost eight times higher than that of Denmark.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in the early 1970s and the 
unfavourable terms of trade at the end of the decade (mainly due to increase in oil prices) 
rang the alarm bell of the Icelandic export-led regime of accumulation. Since then, the 
Icelandic routines of devaluation policy led to a boost in inflation, due to the tight labour 
market and the strong militancy of the Icelandic working class, which frustrated the 
government’s attempts to permanently abolish the index-linking of wage formation in 
order to secure profits in export sectors. The net result of these developments was that 
each successive shock in the 1970s and early 1980s led to successively higher inflation 
peaks (Guðmundsson, 2002: 19), accelerating the wage–price spiral. Along with a 
repressed financial system that lacked markets for securities, this caused the real lending 
rates as well as the real deposit rates to often be negative. While giving borrowers a sub-
stantial subsidy, this situation punished those who deposited their funds in the banks. In 
response, the latter substituted bank deposits by trying to store their wealth in physical 
assets, creating a financial crisis for producers and others who relied on bank credit. As 
expected, the domestic financial system sought relief through foreign borrowing and 
relending at home. The USA’s turn to tight monetary policies in 1979 worsened the 
situation, making inflation explode to 59 per cent. By taking the decision that deposits 
should bear positive real interest rates in order to restore the stock of financial saving, the 
government in 1980 introduced general indexation of financial obligations, including 
bank deposits and bank loans (Eggertsson and Herbertsson, 2005: 13-15). At the same 
Table 2. Labour conflictuality in Nordic countries: days lost per 1000 employees
Period Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Iceland
1960-64 227.0 154.0 106.0 4.6 1706.0
1965-69 31.7 83.1 7.6 19.7 1198.0
1970-74 360.0 597.0 53.4 55.8 1056.0
1975-79 72.2 385.0 28.7 26.8 1278.8
Average 1960-79 172.7 304.8 49.0 26.7 1309.7
Source. Author’s elaboration based on LABORISTA database; Aðalsteinsson 2007.
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time, the high levels of wages and prices led to fast increases in costs of production, 
which led to an increased willingness of capital in the trade and fish sectors to collaborate 
(Jónsson, 1995: 135-40) in order to reduce inflation, mainly through a repressive 
intervention in the labour market that was very similar to the so-called ‘heterodox’ 
programmes adopted in many high-inflation countries in Latin America during the mid-
1980s (Andersen and Guðmundsson, 1998: 13). During the ‘blitzkrieg against inflation’ 
of 1983-1984, the centre-right government that represented those interests ferociously 
cut back workers’ rights to bargain and to strike, bringing the rate of inflation down from 
82.1 to 31 per cent in only one year, while the share of compensation of employees in the 
GDP decreased by 7.1 per cent. On the monetary side, in order to stabilise the currency, 
the government abolished its control over interest rates, allowing the banks to decide 
their levels. As a result, real interest rates almost doubled in only three years. In view of 
this and the connections between the pension funds and at least some of the banks, it is 
not surprising that the pension funds started to invest increasingly in bank bonds at that 
time (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 141)
The relatively favourable development of the costs of production due to the suppres-
sion of the real wages as well as of the great increase in marine export prices in 1986 and 
1987 made it temporarily easier for fish-sector capital to accept the high-interest-rate 
regime, leading to a situation in which claims for currency devaluation (to sustain its 
profitability) were not necessary. Moreover, enormous investment in the fishing sector in 
1985, mainly financed with foreign loans, as well as a general increase in long-term for-
eign debt and debt burden, marked increasing problems of using devaluation as a mean 
to secure the profitability of exporting sectors.8 For all these reasons, the fish sector was 
satisfied with policies of fixed exchange rates as long as wages and inflation were kept 
down and terms of trade were favourable (Jónsson, 1991: 340-341). Yet with the slow-
down in the fisheries’ catch in 1987 and the increase in foreign and domestic interest 
rates, the debt burden became increasingly critical for the firms in the fish sector. This 
means that, when the international credit crunch crisis of 1988 came and real export 
revenue contracted, the Icelandic fish sector was hit hard, swiftly subverting the collabo-
ration between trade and fish-sector capital. The governments in charge from July 1987 
and September 1989 used the same tools to face the economic crisis and to revitalise the 
exports, i.e. currency depreciation, and anti-labour policies.9 After the króna was deval-
ued by 16 per cent between February and May 1988, the government adopted a measure 
to reap the full benefits of that devaluation by restricting the right of worker organisa-
tions to engage in free collective bargaining and prohibiting the right to strike.10 Although 
the government kept trying to manage the labour movements through very repressive 
interventionist forms, the Icelandic working class did not peacefully come to accept the 
long-term redistribution of income in favour of business. In addition to the historical 
industrial relations’ inability of guaranteeing cooperation between labour and capital, the 
fact was simply that ‘under a regime of full employment, the sack would cease to play its 
role as a disciplinary device’ (Kalecki, 1943a: 351). As late as 1988, just as it was through 
the 1980s, the rate of inflation in Iceland was 25 per cent, still well above that of its main 
competitors (Figure 4).
As a result, the fiscal deficit increased significantly whereas the competitive position 
deteriorated by more than 17 per cent between 1984 and 1988 (Guðmundsson et al., 
2000: 9). This, combined with the rapid growth of domestic demand, led to a further 
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widening of the current account imbalance and a progressive build-up of foreign liabili-
ties (Andersen and Guðmundsson, 1998: 12), making devaluation strategy even more 
difficult to protract. Or to put it another way, the goals of matching a satisfactory profit-
ability in the fisheries sector with a restraint on inflation seemed to have become incom-
patible. The only way to come out of this impasse was found in the shifting of priority 
in the trade-off between full employment and low inflation: if during the postwar period 
this dilemma was resolved in favour of employment, since the late-1980s the social actors 
and governments resolved it by favouring price stability, and by institutionalising the 
conflict between capital and labour in order to restore capital accumulation.
The social prerequisites of the financial accumulation 
regime
The recession in 1988 was the driving force behind a fundamental shift in attitudes 
among trade unions, employers and the state towards the need to correct the structural 
imbalances of the Icelandic economy and to remove the threat they posed to inflation 
stability (Óskarsdóttir, 1997; Jónsson, 1991). Coinciding with these shifts was also the 
realisation that devaluations not supported by a consensual incomes policy to manage 
the relationship between the labour market and the economy would have short-lived real 
effects. Hence, one important part of this stage was a significantly lower devaluation bias, 
with the most visual effect of that reorientation being the fundamental change in the 
labour market (Andersen and Guðmundsson, 1998). Following the crisis in 1988, it now 
became possible for ASÍ to deter individual unions and federations from pursuing mili-
tant wage strategies, convincing them that it was more convenient to move from a zero-
sum type of conflict to a positive-sum type, where both parties could expect to gain from 
cooperation to increase economic growth.11 In this respect, the centralised authority of 
ASÍ’s leadership provided coherence of aims against the fragmentation of policies and 
actions between and within the unions, by limiting the capacity of individual unions to 
free-ride on the wage restraint of other unions (Iversen, 1996: 405). Also, the employers’ 
association (SÍ) supported the centralisation of negotiations due to its inability to cope 
Figure 4. Strike activity and inflation rate in Nordic countries (1980-1989, average)
Source. Author’s elaboration based on ILO and World Bank dataset.
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with the political consequences of full employment and the growing discontent over the 
distributive consequences of decentralising the bargaining system (OECD, 1997: 119): 
in 1989, although real wages were decreasing by 9.1 per cent, working days lost in the 
private sector fell to 2,250 from 100,773 in the previous year. Finally, by reducing con-
flictuality, the three main conditions for a corporatist framework’s implementation with 
the goal of coming out of the vicious circle of inflation were present: high degrees of both 
organisational centralisation and associational monopoly (Schmitter, 1981), the partici-
pation of interest organisations in public policy-making (Lehmbruch, I984), and the 
commitment to a ‘social partnership ideology’ in economic policy areas (Schmidt, 1982).
Under these premises, and after it was decided to keep the currency stable against a 
trade-weighted basket of seventeen currencies,12 in 1990 the ASÍ, SÍ and the social-
democratic government signed the ‘National Agreement’, setting the trend for a new 
neo-corporative labour-relations era. After the government convinced the labour unions 
that they should believe in inflation predictions rather than looking at past inflation 
(Andersen and Guðmundsson, 1998: 16), the collective agreement in February 1990 – 
which was to be in effect for a record length of twenty months – predicted that wages 
would only increase according to negotiated ‘red lines’ and that individual groups should 
not get more than other groups, so that the structure of income differences between 
groups would not change (Jónsson, 1991: 192). To ensure this provision, the govern-
ment issued provisional laws in order to defend the National Accord, which specified 
how much all wages in the country were allowed to increase. Thanks to these measures, 
the nominal wages increased by nearly 10 per cent when the rate of inflation was running 
above 14.5, pushing real wages down by 4.9 per cent.
The new rounds of collective bargaining that came underway in 1992 and 1993 
emphasised the need to continue to cooperate in cutting down inflation but also to 
reduce unemployment – which in the meantime had reached an unprecedented high 
level. By this time, however, the attack on salaries was more direct. These agreements 
were stipulated under the promise to keep the currency’s value unchanged and to try to 
influence interest rates in the hope of making them come down (Óskarsdóttir, 1997: 
160). But a few months after the agreements were signed, the government decided, first 
in the wake of turmoil in the European foreign-exchange markets and then at the urging 
of employers in the fishing industry, to depreciate the króna by 6 per cent in November 
1992, and by 7.5 per cent at the end of June 1993. In addition, the government decided 
to lower taxes on companies, whereas taxes on the public were increased.13 The shock 
treatments worked well, enabling the central goals of the trade unions, employers and 
governments: to lower inflation and stabilise the currency, which were finally reached, 
when in the fourth quarter of 1994, the rate of inflation plummeted to 0.4 from 21.1 per 
cent in 1989, allowing a long period of exchange-rate stability to begin. The shift from 
high-employment policies to price-stability strategies responded to the business leaders’ 
class instinct, according to which ‘lasting full employment is unsound from their point 
of view’ (Kalecki, 1943a: 351). Kalecki’s intuition also fits for the Icelandic case, where 
the fall in labour’s share in the first part of the 1990s went together with rising unem-
ployment (Zoega, 2002: 12). During the 1990-1995 period (Figure 5), real wages were 
cut more than 7 per cent and unemployment reached an unprecedented 6 per cent in 
1995, whereas the labour participation rate dropped from over 80 per cent to 76 per 
cent. This made the share of the compensation of employees on the GDP to fall by more 
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than 5 points, whereas the operating surplus of Icelandic companies increased from 20.2 
per cent to 23.4 per cent of GDP.
Despite the massive redistribution of income in favour of profits, the consumption in 
fixed capital – and by implication real economic activity, held steady due to lower pros-
pects for profit rates in productive and commercial sectors in comparison to the general 
rate of interest – entered into a phase of endless increase. The latter was fuelled by the 
liberalisation of long- and short-term capital movements in 1994 and 1995 that made 
the further raising of interest rates inevitable in order to prevent capital outflows as well 
as to attract new foreign investors. Due to the high cost of the króna, new investments 
– whose ratio to GDP averaged 28 per cent in the 1970s and more than 20 per cent in 
the 1980s – fell less than 17 per cent in the 1990s. At the same time, the drop in invest-
ment implied a fall in productivity which moved down from 3.5 per cent in the 1970s 
to only 1.2 per cent in the 1990s. The outcome was that from the early 1990s onwards, 
the leading sector of the Icelandic economy, i.e. the fish sector, lost its competitiveness 
compared to other Nordic economies, its direct competitors in international markets.14 
On the other hand, the manufacturing sector continued to be dominated by very small 
firms and low levels of concentration and centralisation of capital, lacking productivity 
gains (OECD, 2005: 32).15 The stability of the exchange rate, low inflation and a high 
interest rate differential vis-à-vis international markets provided many profitable oppor-
tunities in the financial sector, as the interest shown by foreign and domestic investors in 
the domestic money and securities markets had increased significantly (Guðmundsson 
and Kristinsson, 1997: 68). This led the gross value added in this sector to an incredible 
growth during the period 1990-2006, much higher than other Nordic countries. The 
process of ‘creative destruction’ – that is emigration of investments out of less profitable 
sectors, i.e. fishing and manufacturing sector, and immigration into a more profitable 
one, i.e. finance – transformed the country’s economic landscape, which changed 
through the disappearance of former leading firms, mergers, and the arrival of newcom-
ers (Eggertsson and Herbertsson, 2005: 2), relegating the fisheries to a back seat in the 
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Figure 5. The share of labour on GDP and the unemployment rate
Source. Author’s elaboration based on Iceland Historical Statistics.
450 Capital & Class 36(3)
period, while the weight of the primary and the secondary sectors on the GDP almost 
halved, finance grew in size relative to production, with the GDP share in the banking 
and finance sectors increasing from 15.2 to 27 per cent (Figure 6). Meanwhile, the GDP 
ratio in other services remained quite stable, fluctuating between 42.4 and 41.6 per cent.
The impressive performance experienced by the Icelandic economy from the late-
1990s was sustained by a very strong credit boom that was to a significant degree financed 
by foreign borrowing. The latter was in turn fuelled by the policy of exchange-rate stabil-
ity and explicit and implicit government guarantees of the banking system. The increased 
degree of competition for market shares among financial institutions that accompanied 
the start of the privatisation process in 1998 gave the credit boom a further boost 
(Stiglitz, 2001: 30).16
It is worth noting that neo-corporatism, by reducing endemic conflictuality, greatly 
concurred to lay the foundations of the financial institutions that have boosted the 
Icelandic economy since the late-1990s. With the National Accord in 1990 and the 
agreements that followed, the Icelandic working class went from being one of the most 
combative to becoming one of the quietest in the world. The socioeconomic stability 
enhanced the national economic ‘credibility’ that, combined with the liberalisation of 
the financial market, helped the internal market to attract foreign speculators as well as 
to gain access to loans from international markets (Screpanti, 2001). In turn, inflation 
tendencies due to the massive capital inflow were met by the government by further rais-
ing short-term interest rates, which attracted more foreign capital, leading the króna to 
appreciate and therefore encouraging banks and other financial institutions like pension 
funds to borrow cheaply and buy assets abroad, transforming the revenue streams into 
dramatically higher profits, wages, tax revenues and political support at home (Wade and 
Sigurgeirsdóttir, 2011: 58).
Yet, intermediation had not neutralised nor subverted struggling interests between 
capital and labour in Iceland, due to the incapacity of industrial management to secure 
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restructuring: the fishing sector (Eythórsson 2000). By giving permission for the transfer 
of quota shares between vessels with different owners,17 the reform of the Individual 
Transferable Quota (ITQ) in 1991 removed the opportunity for fishing communities to 
earn income from fishing, with the result of a massive re-distribution of wealth and 
income (Árnason, 1992, Knútsson and Gestsson, 2001). Over time, the quota system 
resulted in increased profitability and considerable wealth creation, which became one of 
the main pillars in the subsequent banking-based economy (Daníelsson and Zoega, 
2009: 4). Nevertheless, the new ITQ system became also one of the main reasons for the 
renewal of the conflict in the labour market.18
However, in controlling a strategic branch of the national economy, the ITQ owners 
were in a strong position, which allowed them to put pressure on the government to 
reform the regulation of labour relations, aiming to provide more stringent conditions 
to call for strikes. Starting from the belief that the new ITQ system was the ‘best resource 
management system in the world’,19 the position of ASÍ’s leadership was very support-
ive: ‘the making of free contract without any troubles gives stability and social peace. 
The question is how to reach this goal’. The agreement between the ‘social partners’ and 
the government concerning the keeping of social peace in the fish industry laid the way 
for the drastic reform of industrial relations in the country in 1996 (Act no. 75), with 
the purpose of speeding up negotiations between the federation of the employers and 
labour unions to improve the functioning of the market (OECD, 1999: 81). The way 
to this goal was found, on the one hand, by fixing special, stringent conditions for strike 
declarations, and on the other, by imposing compulsory arbitration when the parties did 
not reach agreement, or when a certain number of days of strike had elapsed. Therefore, 
on the pretext of speeding up the bargaining process, the government created a juridical 
organism clearly tied to political power and hence submitted to its political and eco-
nomic targets.
Table 3 displays the conflictuality level, the rate of inflation, rate of interest, union 
density, and GDP growth since 1980. In the first period, from 1980 to 1989, the 
endemic conflictuality was coupled with an inflationist spiral, which in turn was reflected 
in negative real interest rates. The socioeconomic setting drastically changed after 1990. 
From this year, the decline of strike activity – it decreased by 84 and 96 per cent com-
pared to the two previous decades – resulted in a substantial drop of inflation, at 35 
points lower compared to the previous periods. As a consequence, and due to the 
Table 3. The socio-political construction of monetarism









1980–89 21.857 68,2 39,3 –2,8 3,2
1990–99  3.507 80,9  4,2  8,4 2,3
2000–07    946 87,5  4,7 10,5 4,4
Source. Author’s elaboration from OECD dataset and Statistics Iceland.  
Note. Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator.
452 Capital & Class 36(3)
liberalisation in financial-market transactions, real interest rates shot upwards, to 8.4 and 
more than 10 per cent during 1990-99 and 2000-07 periods, respectively.
Besides the reform of labour relations and the establishment of very long agreements 
between unions and employers’ associations,20 the radical decline in the militancy of 
Icelandic workers may be found in the same monetarist criteria adopted since the mid-
1990s, in which employees were ‘forced’ to go into debt as well as having to redirect their 
savings towards the financial markets, therefore reinforcing the risk that control over 
labour was enhanced via the volatility of financial markets (Bellofiore and Halevi, 2008: 
3-9). On the other hand, a Central Bank of Iceland reform that introduced ‘inflation 
targeting’ in 2001 whilst raising interest rates, had the effect of further disciplining the 
workers: from that moment on, wage increases had to be at a level compatible with the 
inflation target. Otherwise, any wage requests advanced by the unions that were higher 
than the monetary expansion announced by the Central Bank would have generated 
unemployment, and therefore would have been irrational. The implication was that any 
conflicting behaviour adopted by the trade unions in order to obtain wage gains would 
have been self-defeating for the workers.21
What is most surprising in the above table is the union density column: contrary to 
what one might expect, this variable has seen a growing trend by almost 20 points, mak-
ing Iceland the country with the highest union density in the world. This means that 
economic liberalisation did not replace the organisations with the ‘market’; that is, it did 
not push towards the disorganisation of labour relations, as the prevailing governance 
mechanism. While trade unions are almost universally on the defensive, having suffered 
a decline in membership, in public status and in effectiveness in achieving their core 
objectives (Hyman, 2007: 195), Icelandic labour unions seemed to have resisted the 
neoliberal march. This has been so despite the fact that also in Iceland conservative and 
market-oriented governments have been in power for most of the last twenty years, 
accomplishing a process of strong liberalisation. On the other hand, by increasing its 
membership and influence on Icelandic society, ASÍ became one of the major economic 
and political players in the country.
The impressive economic growth experienced by Iceland from the late-1990s, besides 
lowering unemployment, allowed ASÍ to achieve improvements in real wages and social 
benefits that had the effect of satisfying members’ expectations which, in turn, strength-
ened its social and political legitimation. On the other hand, due to the great credibility 
and status of ASÍ leaders among the employers and the government – and their shared 
interests – neoliberal coalitions had fewer reasons to fight the trade unions. This strategy, 
however, presumed that this type of economic growth was sustainable and that, although 
in a context of capitalistic compatibilities, it would also conciliate its members (workers) 
demands to governmental and employers requests. The economic crisis that began in 
2008 revealed that such conciliation of interests was very ephemeral and that in reality, 
Icelandic workers were embedded into a speculative economic growth. To put it bluntly, 
the truth behind the Icelandic miracle was that the huge indebtedness worked like a drug 
deliberately injected into the system with the express aim of masking a latent profitability 
crisis in the fish sector, sustaining a restructuration that could not be sustained. Once the 
bubble burst, this untenable regime of accumulation was quick to show its real sub-
stance, or lack thereof.
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The missing link between the consensus of the  
labour unions and the financial elite: The 
occupational pension funds
The consensus of the Icelandic unions concerning the new wave of neoliberal policies 
did not rely only on ideological reasons. Rather, the common view on the macroeco-
nomic goals shared with neoliberal coalitions and financial elite needs to be understood 
in the light of the fact that the ASÍ was not only a defense institution for the interests of 
the employees, but also an ‘institution of money’ (Minsky, 1982) whose main goal was 
to seek profits. More specifically, the real cause at the bottom of the acceptance of 
restraint policies, which has paved the way for the liberalisation of the economy since the 
early-’90s, was that ASÍ was heavily involved in the management of a financial entity, 
namely the occupational pension funds.
The origin of the pension fund scheme goes back to the Independent Party–Social 
Democratic coalition in the 1960s, when ASÍ experienced a democratic internal involu-
tion due to its entering the central committee of people linked to each political party, not 
just those of the left (Kjartansson, 1992: 233). Conversely, the conservative influence 
within the labour movement grew enormously during the same period. Moreover, the 
IP’s relationship with employers and the combined IP-SDP trade union strength created 
networks of interests that, by linking together the leadership of the major social and 
economic interests of the system, reduced the potential conflict between capital, labour, 
and the state.22 It was within this context that a comprehensive private pension fund 
scheme – under the joint control of trade union leaders and employers’ associations – 
was established, following a tripartite collective agreement between the social actors and 
the state in 1969. While the goal of the employers was to increase national savings in 
order to supply long-term finance in the capital market for the development of their 
businesses (Toporowski, 2000: 51), the ASÍ leaders believed that the pension funds – 
mainly invested into the newborn People’s Bank, which was under the direct control of 
ASÍ – would promote a more equitable political economy, reversing the social conse-
quences of the crisis that had hit Iceland towards the end of the 1960s. They thought 
that in increasing the labour movements’ influence in controlling the funds, strengthen-
ing their bargaining power and helping workers to gain access to capital, a ‘labour con-
trol’ of the accumulation process would have been enabled (Skýrsla forseta ASÍ, 
1969/1972: 130-31).
Over time, the value of pension assets was increasingly depreciated by inflationist 
tendencies due to the impasses brought about by the export-led regime of accumulation 
(see section 1). In response, the composition, priorities, tactics and original strategies of 
ASÍ officials regarding the economic use of the pension funds changed. Whilst capitalists 
continued to use the biggest quota of national saving to expand their profits, the trade 
unions had to find new solutions to rapidly restore the value of the pension assets they 
controlled along with employers. Until the mid-1970s – when the ‘export-led growth’ 
regime of accumulation guaranteed high economic growth – unions could struggle for 
both expansive policies beneficial for productive investments and full employment, 
despite the inflationary bias of this regime. At the end of the decade, however, high 
inflation – and thus negative real interest rates on deposits – depleted the assets of the 
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pension funds. But thanks to the introduction of financial indexation in 1979, free 
interest rates in 1986, and the positive economic conjuncture until 1987, the pension 
funds greatly rebuilt their assets. Until the liberalisation of market transactions with the 
entrance of Iceland into the EEA in 1994, the pension funds were mostly invested in 
safe domestic fixed-income securities, predominantly with government guarantees, and 
a significant part of them went to finance the public housing loan system, and to lend 
directly to their members. Variable income securities were only at 4.5 per cent, and 
foreign assets were at 1.9 per cent (Figure 7). When the ‘devaluation strategies’ could not 
work anymore, as debt burden became increasingly critical, the unions and employers 
who managed them along with the financial sector lobbied successfully to create those 
structural conditions – low inflation (or wage repression) and stable currency exchange 
– in preparation for the relaxation of financial restrictions, allowing these funds to find 
new channels to invest in, in order to look for the most cynical and opportunistic ways 
to the highest yields, to serve the interests of their members (Lipietz, 2000: 30). If until 
then the investment options of pension funds had been limited because of the repressed 
financial system – where no formal markets for bonds and equity existed, and the pur-
chase of foreign securities was forbidden – the liberalisation of the economy became a 
more appealing option: in fact, due to the depressing state of the economy, it was clear 
that the domestic economy could never provide an investment platform for pension-
fund capital (Sigurjónsson, 2009: 63). By being one of the biggest savings institutions in 
the country, and therefore one of the most powerful economic players in Iceland, the 
occupational pension funds played a central role in laying the foundation of financialisa-
tion of the Iceland economy. As Eggertsson and Herbertsson (2005: 18) pointed out, 
‘Prior to the liberalisation of the financial system the pension funds had very few choices 
for properly investing their funds …. However, the coincidence of the new pension sys-
tem and liberalisation of financial markets had powerful interactive effects …. The 
strong demand by the pension funds for financial instruments combined with new 
opportunities for supplying securities was the catalyst that in the 1990s rapidly triggered 
a vibrant market for securities in Iceland.’ As can be seen in Figure 7, the composition of 
pension funds’ portfolio has changed dramatically since 1995. At the end of 2005, fixed 
income securities were down to 49.1 per cent, housing bonds were down by more than 
half, and lending to members was a little less than 8 per cent. On the other hand, the 
share of equity had increased to over 48 percent, whereas the proportion of foreign assets, 
that was less than 2 per cent in 1995, rose to 24.7 per cent ten years later, and the bulk 
of them were in the form of equity and shares in open-end and closed-end mutual funds.
The existence of a very objective, materially grounded reason for relevant members of 
the working class to cooperate with the capitalist class to impose anti-inflationary poli-
cies does not require the decision-making processes of unions to be conceived of in a 
strictly deterministic and unidirectional way. As Engels (1972: 294) puts it,
The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure – political 
forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: … juridical forms, and even the reflexes of 
all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants … also exercise their influence upon 
the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their 
form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of … the 
economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary.
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Structure and agency are as a rule dialectically related, and in this case trade union 
support for neoliberal policy boosting financial yields was contained in potentiality 
within the capitalist property form of the pension funds themselves. Given that the 
determined phenomenon is potentially present in the determinant one, and given that 
the determinant (realised) phenomenon has a specific contradictory social content which 
it received ultimately from the ownership-relation, the determinant phenomenon calls 
into existence the determined one, and thereby transfers to it its own contradictory social 
content (Carchedi, 2008: 500). In concrete terms, the joined ownership-relation on 
occupational pension fund appears to have united two essentially divided groups, trans-
ferring to the new ‘actor network’ which manages this financial institution its own con-
tradictory social contest. The lack of rules about how much time each member could sit 
on the pensions board means that many of the same unions, employers’ leaders and 
pension funds managers have occupied these positions for extended periods of time. The 
significance is that linkages and cooperation, developed over time, can be reasonably 
expected. The increasing involvement of pensions in the investment system of the coun-
try reinforced those links, creating a vast and complicated network of personal, financial 
and interlocking directorships, leading to concentration and centralisation in the finan-
cial sector and in the corporate community (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 270). As Baldvinsdóttir 
suggests, ASÍ has not only ‘potential’ financial strength, but a real one. The inner circle 
of ASÍ is on the board of directors of equity funds, security firms, leasing companies, 
state funds and credit card companies. There are many examples of figures who linked 
the labour movement, the employers association, the pension funds, the political and the 
financial systems:
Benedikt Davíðsson the president of ASÍ during the period 1992-1996, and Gunnar J. 
Friðriksson from SÍ, served as chairmen of The Association of General Pension Funds 
continuously during the period 1983 -1995. They also were on the board of The People’s Bank 
and the Industrial Bank, and Guðmundur H. Garðarsson from the National Association of 
























Figure 7. Pension funds’ assets (1995-2005)
Source. Author’s elaboration from Central Bank of Iceland data.
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influential within the pension fund industry, the labour movement (ASÍ) and the Federation of 
Employers. Furthermore, it should be noted that these same three men have been key members 
over the last 30-40 years in collective bargaining negotiations between ASÍ, SÍ and the state. 
Hence, they created strong links between the pension fund industry, the private banks, the 
labour movement and the SÍ. (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 164-165)
The parallel development of banking and pension systems materially supported the 
establishment of this cooperation and these linkages. During the 1960s, the foundation 
of the three new private banks – two of them heavily tied to ASI and the biggest pension 
funds of the country – was made possible by the liquidity provided by the pension funds. 
The institution of the pension funds was thus, in many ways, the pre-condition for the 
establishment of the banks, with pension fund money providing the backbone for these 
banks. Moreover, with the steadily growing funds in the pension fund industry, all the 
private banks established even stronger ties between them and the pension funds, and all 
key members on the board of the pensions funds have been or are on the board of direc-
tors of the banks (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998). This complex of interactions resulted in the 
redefinition of the banking system in the aftermath of the systemic crisis of the fishing 
industry that swept the state-owned Fisheries Bank in 1987 (up to this moment the big-
gest financer of the primary sector). At that time, the credit institutions controlled by the 
labour movement, the employers and the biggest Icelandic pension funds – respectively 
the People’s Bank, the Industrial Bank and the Bank of Commerce – joined together and 
at the same time took over the shares in the Fisheries Bank. Out of this merger emerged 
Íslandsbanki, which became the only major privately held commercial bank in Iceland, 
and was publicly listed in 1993. If the Icelandic banking system was, de facto, under the 
control of the political parties prior to the 1987 crisis, power shifted afterwards to unions 
and employers’ organisations. In general, out of 58.7 per cent of the shares in Íslandsbanki, 
private pension funds and trade unions owned 32.9 per cent, private employers 17.5 per 
cent and state funds 8.3 per cent. This meant that Íslandsbanki’s backbone was private 
pension funds and labour movement funds. In 1992, 45 per cent of all the shares that 
the private pensions fund industry owned were in Íslandsbanki. This implies that, despite 
the inner circle of ASÍ having an active role within the banking industry, Íslandsbanki 
was well positioned to use the pension funds as a captive pool of money to personally 
profit, despite the cost to workers.
The existing network of relations between the pension industry, Íslandsbanki and the 
larger companies clearly opened channels of communications and cooperation among 
pension funds, industrial companies, insurance companies and other enterprises 
(Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 148). This cooperation was sustained both by concentration 
within the financial market and pension funds, whose number has declined in the last 
twenty years (Nordic Statistical Committee, 2009)23 and by the concentration of power 
within ASÍ, where the bargaining process had been getting more and more centralised 
during the early 1990s. These concentrations had a mutual character. On the one hand, 
the scale economies required by the financial market’s rationality encouraged pension 
funds amalgamation in order to save in operational costs, diversify the risk and so on. On 
the other, because pension membership is based on union affiliation, the conglomeration 
of the labour unions implied a concentration within the pension funds industry. Because 
many of these same people from the board of ASÍ and SÍ are also on the board of pension 
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funds, it follows that decision-making became concentrated in the hands of a few people, 
who accordingly exerted a large influence on both collective bargaining and on the 
investment policy of the pension funds. This cooperation means that ASÍ is restricted in 
what actions it can take to secure a better living standard for its members, since that 
might affect other interests for which it is responsible, such as in the banking and the 
pension industries (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 157). Two leaders of unions in the public sec-
tor expressed their concern over this cooperation between ASÍ and SÍ. They said that 
whilst ASÍ and SÍ were working in harmony, ASÍ was moving away from other trade 
union federations, and in many cases working against them (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 126).
The problem was that under the new circumstances, the pension fund high returns 
could come into conflict with labour policies, both at macro and micro levels (Ghilarducci, 
1992). First, the introduction of pension funds in company capital ensured that more 
and more workers adopted the perspective of capital owners, nevertheless strengthening 
individualisation and solidarity among the working class. Indeed, although their boards 
consist of an equal representation of workers and employers, the ‘deferred wages’ are run 
by the ‘pension funds money managers’, who are mainly interested in what has been 
called ‘total returns’ (Minsky, 1982). This means that trade union leaders remained unin-
volved in the investment decisions of the companies, giving the companies’ board of 
directors considerable freedom to use these investments (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 266). 
They could be used to take over or invest in other companies, or, because of the demands 
of the pension funds for high returns from the companies in which they invested, put 
increasing pressure on company managements to increase profit and dividends. This 
meant that workers became ‘employees’ and ‘owners’ at the same time, and accordingly, 
that increasing companys’ profitability became their interest.
Second, the new investments opportunities required by the pension funds as well as 
by other financial institutions transferred considerable parts of economic power from the 
public sector to the private sector. The strong privatisation programme that got under-
way in 1991 (OECD, 1999: 82), apart from not being thwarted in any way by ASÍ, laid 
the base for the reduction of public expenditure, helping private companies to easily take 
loans from banks (OECD, 1999: 45-47). Pension funds have increasingly been invested 
in in mutual funds that have played a role in the government’s privatisation programme, 
both as advisors and arrangers (Ministries of Industry and Commerce, 1997). However, 
not only did the state take on the function of supporting financial expansion, but it also 
became a source of financial surplus. The social function of the ‘ideology of surplus pub-
lic budget’ has therefore strengthened those political forces that considered the market as 
the polar star of their actions, making the level of employment ever more dependent on 
the capitalists’ state of confidence, which is often inversely proportion to state activity in 
the economy (Kalecki, 1943b).24
Third, following the liberalisation of market transactions with Iceland’s entrance into 
the EEA in 1994, attention began to be focused on the rapid and ongoing opening and 
closing opportunities for speculation in one type of assets or another. Pension funds 
started to be increasingly invested abroad in speculative activities in order to achieve the 
best return-risk combination available at any time. For a small economy like Iceland, the 
consequences of worker resource outflow were devastating: if, on the one hand, this huge 
amount of capital moving out of the country couldn’t be used to fund national produc-
tive investments, on the other hand, pension funds were heavily affected by turbulence 
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in the global market in 2001 and to a greater degree in 2008, causing a massive drop in 
the wealth of Icelandic workers when the international crisis depreciated many of the 
assets in which these funds were invested.25
Fourth, with the new pension regulation, the list of permissible financial instruments 
became broad enough to include most types of investment (OECD, 1999: 110), and 
pension funds were the fundamental actor inflating the Icelandic housing bubble rapidly 
from the early 2000s up to the 2008 crisis.26 Although the rise in housing prices was first 
and foremost due to the entry of the newly privatised banks into the Icelandic housing 
mortgage market (Sveinsson, 2011: 68), pension funds played a crucial role by investing 
in those mortgages’ bonds issued by the banks.27 When the lender can be divorced from 
from the innate risk of all loans in such a way, however, there is no incentive to investi-
gate financial security and borrowers’ ability to pay. This means that pension funds had 
no control over which households were issued loans, nor their terms (IFRI).28 Because all 
long-term housing loans were linked to the consumer price index, the collapse of the 
króna and the explosion of inflation in the first several months of the 2008 crisis increased 
housing loan debt by nearly 30 per cent across the board in nominal value. As a result, 
those who had debts (mortgages and consumer debts) in Icelandic króna became the 
victims of increased inflation associated with the collapse (Ólafsson, 2010: 32).
Last but not least, the flow of pension funds into the international speculative market 
benefited from high domestic interest rates in spite of helping them to improve their rate 
of return from domestic financial investment, as well as allowing them to purchase 
foreign securities relatively more cheaply. This had nevertheless made the expansion of 
productive investments inside the country more difficult. Actually, the establishment 
Íslandsbanki has often led the way for the other banks by setting high interest rates, 
which has been the one of the main factors in helping the pension funds to build up their 
assets and improve their financial standing (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 141). Although the 
‘social partners’ officially continued to be involved in discussions focusing on how to 
lower inflation, and ASÍ’s leadership assured its membership that interest rates would 
decrease in order to revitalise investments, the interest rates continued move forward. As 
the trade unions were heavily criticised for having failed to get interest rates down, the 
government established a wage committee with representatives from ASÍ and SÍ, with 
the task of monitoring the cost of living and with the aim of working towards lower 
interest rates. The three trade union officials sitting on this committee, however, were the 
same directors that sat on the board of Íslandsbanki and on the larger pension funds 
(Óskarsdóttir, 1997), for which anti-inflationist measures were presumably most appro-
priate to fill the pension funds and banks’ coffers. Alike, the pension funds’ massive 
investments in private mortgage market generated another paradox of the retirement 
workers’ savings: if the interest on mortgage loans is low, although the mortgager (often 
a worker) will benefit from it, then his pension will likewise be low. If the interest 
payments are high, although the mortgager-worker will run into difficulties, then his 
pension will likewise become higher. The result was that right before the bursting of the 
speculative bubble in October 2008, the real interest rates in Iceland were at 15 per cent, 
stimulating further financial profitability, carry trade, currency appreciation and a huge 
level of debt.29 The latter dynamic has also been described in detail by Wade and 
Sigurgeirsdóttir. However, this is only the final part of the story. To stick to this means to 
fall into a trap of financial determinism, because it overlooks the fact that the pension-
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fund industry was a decisive device that, interlinking the unions, employers and govern-
ment’s actions and embedding industrial relations in a financial economic context, made 
the social actors fundamental players in restoring capitalistic (financial) accumulation.
The rescuer of last resort
The perverse consequences of financialisation on the working class have been revealed in 
their entirety with the explosion of the financial crisis in 2008, which further pushed the 
subsumption of labour under financial capital. Since the beginning of emergency in 
October 2008, ASÍ has not offered any noteworthy resistance to the government’s deter-
mination to shift the crisis onto the workers.30 Rather, it followed the dictates of the IMF, 
which provided a loan of USD$2.1bn, subject to the running of a ‘structural adjustment 
programme’. Such an amount is approximately equal to the total direct fiscal costs of the 
financial crisis (about 20 per cent of GDP), which is higher than in any other country 
except Ireland (OECD, 2011: 20). Even leaving aside the IMF loan’s interest, each 
Icelander is forced to contribute a staggering USD$8,000 to bail out those financial insti-
tutions that helped cause the financial meltdown. In a document released in the wake of 
the collapse of the banking system, the ASÍ congress claimed, ‘Assistance from the IMF is 
a key step towards boosting confidence and achieving these objectives [currency appre-
ciation as a prerequisite of lower interest rates]’ (ASÍ, 2008). The desire to regain ‘finan-
cial stability’ in Iceland was finally formalised at the end of June 2009 through a 
neo-corporatist agreement, officially named the ‘Stability Pact’, between the left-green/
social-democratic government, trade unions and employers’ organisations, which satis-
fied the whole set of IMF’s policies. The goals of the Pact are as follows. First, the restora-
tion of a ‘functioning and viable banking system’ by a massive operation of recapitalisation 
by means of public resources, with a view to the next privatisation in the future. Second, 
‘stabilisation of the currency’ in order to combat the threat of inflation and to stem capi-
tal outflow by increasing the interest rates which have further strangled investments. 
Third, ‘consolidation of the fiscal position’, which has dramatically worsened as a conse-
quence of the injection of public funds in favour of the banks and the repayments of the 
debts to the IMF – by increasing income taxes and implementing fiscal restraints, i.e. cuts 
in social spending, tighter means testing for social benefits, reductions in the wage bills, 
and significant scaling back of investment spending (IMF, 2009a).
Although the bail-out of the capitalist class at the expense of the working class repre-
sents the usual way in which capitalism has historically tried to resolve its contradictions 
(crisis), the unprecedented qualitative datum consists of pension fund exploitation to 
finance the IMF’s rescue package – first and foremost the recapitalisation of the three 
new banks, and the funding of the fiscal austerity that it implies. No matter that such 
funds have incurred significant losses as a result of the bankruptcy of the private banking 
system and the national and international stock market collapse;31 they nevertheless 
seem to be the only entity in Iceland with any liquidity today, which needs to be put to 
work. In agreement with the government and the Central Bank, and after measures to 
restrict currency outflows temporarily in order to prevent capital outflow were intro-
duced by those bodies in October 2008, the trade unions and employer confederation 
decided to transfer a considerable amount of the pension fund liquid foreign assets into 
Iceland– which as a result went down from 26 to 21 per cent of their entire portfolio 
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(Figure 8). This was an attempt to strengthen the króna (Magnússon, 2008), to sustain 
the Icelandic stock market, and, according to the labour leadership claims, to increase 
productive capacity by means of public investments.
Concerning this last point, the same Stability Pact promised that ‘concerted effort will 
be made to move forward on plans for other major industrial investment’ such as hospi-
tals, tunnels, schools and highways in order to increase income levels and as a result, 
employment in the interests of their owners, i.e. the workers. Predictably, due to the 
embeddedness of the pension funds in the financial market mechanism, the ideological 
attitude of the social partners they are managed by, the difficult state of the government’s 
finances, and the constraints laid down by the IMF plan, these prospects have been 
revealed to be deceitful. To date, no public social investment from pension funds has 
been made, whereas pension-fund holdings in national companies are at an all-time low 
(Anderson, 2009a; Anderson, 2009b; News Frettir, 2009a; News Frettir, 2009b; 
Agnarsson, 2010; Coats, 2011a; Coats, 2011b). The reality is that, with no real corpo-
rate bond or equity market to invest in due to the dearth of domestic investment oppor-
tunities with an acceptable risk-return balance (Sighvatsson, 2010), along with the 
capital restriction that de facto forbade the making of new investments in foreign cur-
rency-denominated assets, the occupational pension funds had few options apart from 
buying government-guaranteed paper and bank deposits (Roerhrbein, 2010, IMF, 2011: 
5) in order to lower the financial pressures of the country and to buy back some of their 
long-term debt to the Icelandic banks (Buiter and Sibert, 2008: 10-22). Although three 
rating agencies – Moody’s Investors Service, Fitch Ratings, and Standard & Poor’s – 
assigned a negative sovereign credit rating to the Republic of Iceland, Icelandic pension 
funds have increased by more than tenfold their purchase of securities issued by the 
Central Government, from almost ISK21 million in November 2007 to more than 
ISK272 million in May 2012. Put differently, by purchasing tradable but very risky gov-
ernment bonds, the deferred workers’ salary is injected into the three banks, Glitnir, 
Kaupthing and Landsbanki, all nationalised in 2008, but which have since been largely 
re-privatised.32 This has limited the funding pressures on the domestic financial market.
Figure 8. Pension fund’s assets (2007-2011)
Source. Author’s elaboration from Central Bank of Iceland data.
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The most conflicting operation in this process was the so-called ‘Avens deal’, after 
which the HFF bonds share in the pension funds’ portfolio increased from 12 to 29 per 
cent (Figure 8). HFF is a wholly owned state provider for mortgage loans which aims to 
provide access to housing for low-income households, accounting for 64 per cent of 
Iceland’s ISK1.23 trillion in outstanding mortgage debt at the end of June 2010.33 
Despite the fact that ratings agencies were giving a negative outlook on such bonds, in 
May 2010, 26 pension funds agreed to liquidate foreign assets to pay a price of €549m 
to purchase the far more risky HFF bonds worth ISK90bn, owned by the Treasury. The 
aim was to help boost liquidity into the economy, by increasing the Central Bank of 
Iceland’s foreign exchange reserves as well as to pay all of the Treasury’s debt until 2015, 
by providing it with low-cost, long-term funding (Central Bank of Iceland, 2011: 9, 11). 
Már Guðmundsson, governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, best described the impact 
of ‘Avens deal’: ‘This agreement paves the way for the removal of capital controls while 
highlighting the enormous advantage that lies in Iceland’s having such strong pension 
funds. With their participation, our pension funds have put their shoulder to the wheel 
of the economic recovery’ (Central Bank of Iceland, 2010).
This transaction could give rise to (and in some cases it has already given rise to) very 
negative consequences for the rightful owners of the pension funds, namely the workers. 
First, the extremely low interest rates at which these schemes have lent money to the 
Treasury34 mean that they will ensure virtually no returns on workers’ pensions. Second, 
the slump by more than 20 percent in real disposable incomes of Icelandic households in 
a context in which their debt reached about 220 percent of disposable income, higher 
than that of the USA (IMF, 2008: 9), has further weighted the household debt burden, 
making 40 percent of homeowners ‘technically insolvent’ (Valdimarsson, 2010a). This 
means that the pension funds invested in HFF bonds, despite the risk of default of this 
institution that could occur, would burn substantial amounts of workers’ resources. 
Third, and directly connected to the previous point, due to the fact that pension funds 
are currently Iceland’s main mortgage lenders, this has rendered pension funds a kind of 
de facto debt collectors. This explains why pension funds have fiercely opposed the pro-
posal advanced by some members of the government and the committees of the families 
to write-off bad loans with the purpose of helping those households increasingly stran-
gled by mortgage debt. Precisely because ‘this measure would mean that members will 
see their pensions cut’ (Valdimarsson, 2010b), as the managing director of the Icelandic 
Pension Funds Association clearly admitted.
Finally, with capital controls having temporarily stopped further foreign investments, 
the pension funds played an important role in the process of the ‘consolidation of the 
fiscal position’, by financing the large fiscal deficit (Guðmundsson, 2010: 3) due to the 
nationalisation of the failed banking system. As the chief of the IMF Icelandic mission 
sincerely pointed out, external debt as well as public debt are sustainable thanks to pension 
funds. Although acting casually, he declared that ‘the public and external debt stock is 
expected to decline [because] Iceland does not face the same fiscal problems that other 
countries have thanks to its funded pension system [and that] Iceland has significant foreign 
assets, including those held by the country’s fully-funded pension system’ (IMF, 2009b). 
The meaning of these words is quite clear. Or if it isn’t, then the task of the workers’ pen-
sions is better specified in the next IMF Report: ‘Iceland’s funded pension system is a key 
comfort when considering medium-term fiscal sustainability. Iceland’s funded pension 
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system has assets, based on end-2008 data, in excess of 100 per cent of GDP …. The 
fully-funded pension schemes in Iceland imply that there are no hidden fiscal adjustment 
needs’ (IMF, 2009c).
ASÍ’s support was crucial for the implementation of the fiscal consolidation as pro-
vided for in the IMF’s structural adjustment plan. Although, since the end of 2007, 
Iceland has experienced the highest unemployment increase and the heaviest fall in real 
wages among OECD countries, the centre-left coalition was very fast and successful in 
putting IMF prescriptions into practice due to the social peace guaranteed by the 
Federation of Labour: ‘The government was able to agree on a fiscal package with its 
social partners, and good progress has been made on the immensely complicated task of 
restructuring Iceland’s failed banks …. The government has implemented spending cuts 
and revenue-raising measures … to keep the … deficit contained, and has put together 
a medium-term adjustment plan that has the support of labour unions and other social 
partners’ (IMF, 2009b).
Summary and conclusions
In this paper, I have explored the decisive role of the pension funds in the restructuring 
of the Icelandic economy, arguing that, through their involvement in the pension funds 
industry, the labour unions greatly contributed to laying the foundations of economic 
financialisation. This has involved a detailed study of the co-evolution of industrial rela-
tions with the ongoing process of economic financialisation, where they adjusted to one 
another until a viable institutional configuration emerged (Crouch et al., 2005: 367). 
First, I examined how the export-led growth regime of accumulation’s structural crisis 
produced an explosion of inflation and labour conflictuality in the late-1980s. Yet the 
goals of matching satisfactory profitability in the leading sector of the economy, i.e. fish-
eries, with the restraint of inflation seemed to have become incompatible, due to the low 
productivity of Icelandic industries combined with industrial relations’ inability to guar-
antee cooperation between labour and capital, specific to this regime. Second, I retraced 
the way the concentration of power within the Icelandic Federation of Labour (ASI) and 
the increasing centralisation of the bargaining system enabled lower inflation and stabi-
lisation of the currency. Although there was no economic determination of institutions, 
but rather contingency and scope for strategic choice (Boyer, 1988), this led to a massive 
redistribution of income in favour of profits. However, real economic activity held steady 
due to the endless increase in interest rates that, although strangling new productive 
investments, provided many profitable opportunities in the financial sector by absorbing 
enormous masses of speculative capital from the rest of the world. In these circum-
stances, the socioeconomic stability provided by the labour organisations was the vital 
element on which the new financial regime of accumulation was built. It enhanced the 
national economic ‘credibility’ that, combined with the liberalisation of the financial 
market, helped the internal market to attract foreign speculators as well as gaining access 
to loans from international markets (Screpanti, 2001).
Third, I argued that the Icelandic unions’ consensus concerning the ‘stabilisation 
programme’ implemented by the neoliberal coalitions relies on their embeddedness into 
the financial structures of the national economy through financial institutions, namely 
occupational pension funds. Through their establishment, a new ‘actor-network’ has 
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been constructed by the unions and employers who managed them, along with the 
financial sector. Thus, new power relations emerged which appear to have united two 
essentially divided groups with diametrically opposed interests. Since then, as 
Baldvinsdóttir (1998) has pointed out, ‘the “interests” of the trade unions have become 
so tightly entwined with employers’ interests, mainly through the pension industry, that 
they cannot be separated’. In other words, the leaders of ASÍ have, through the pension 
industry, become locked into a network of relations which have had ‘unintended’ conse-
quences for the ordinary members of ASÍ. Once traditional channels of investments 
exhausted their profitability opportunities, these cooperations and linkages sped up the 
creation of those structural conditions – i.e. low inflation (or wage repression) and stable 
currency exchange – a preparation to the relaxation of financial restrictions, allowing 
these funds to find new channels to invest in.35 As one of the biggest savings institutions 
in the country, the need for assets of the occupational pension funds was one the main 
drivers behind the reversal of the causal link between the real and the financial economy 
(Engelen, 2003: 1367).
Fourth, I analysed how the involvement of Icelandic trade unions in the financial 
mechanisms through the pension industry generated a degree of identification with 
pro-market governmental policy on the part of union leaders, encouraging them to 
tailor their own strategies accordingly. This was particularly evident in the aftermath of 
the banking crisis that hit the country in October 2008, where the workers’ resources 
were used to save and restore the same financial environment that has ultimately con-
ducted Iceland first towards stagnation, then towards financialisation, and lastly 
towards a collapse. Contrary to what is going on in Greece, Ireland, and many other 
countries, where the national trade unions are manifesting their disagreement with the 
structural adjustment packages imposed by the IMF, the Icelandic Federation of Labour 
was committed to immediately starting a collaborative, consensus-building process that 
would be required for the implementation of the IMF macroeconomic programme, 
with all the well-known consequences it implies.36 As ‘institutions of money’, whose 
main goal is profit-seeking activity, Icelandic unions are still buried in a vicious circle: 
any conflictual actions could destabilise the economy and allow capital-holders to ‘pun-
ish’ policies that fail to match the criteria of rectitude embraced in financial markets 
(Hyman, 1999: 92).
Approaching the problem from a Polanyian-Regulationist perspective, the Icelandic 
case masterfully shows how the instauration of a financial expansion was not a natural 
development: it was created by and embedded within politics and society. To narrow the 
sphere of the economic genus specifically to market phenomena is to eliminate the great-
est part of man’s history from the scene (Polanyi, 1977: 6). Thus neglecting the signifi-
cance of broader structural determinants, it is then only too easy to attribute unions’ 
strategies to the personal characteristics of members or leaders (Hyman, 1975: 69). 
Through their connection with the pension funds industry, Icelandic trade unions were 
structurally coupled to the financial mechanism: they were ‘embedded’ within it. This 
means that economic liberalisation did not replace the organisations with the ‘market’; 
that is, it did not push towards the disorganisation of labour relations, as the prevailing 
governance mechanism. Nevertheless, the Icelandic case highlights the fact that the pen-
sion funds high returns (market) can conflict with labour policies (society), both at 
macro and micro level. The intensification of pressure specifically for short-term yields 
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has diverted the pension funds in speculative circuits that are ever more risky, creating 
the illusion of an autonomous and automatic prosperity. In such a way, Icelandic employees 
achieved improvements in real wages, pension returns, and social benefits since the late-
1990s. The economic crisis in 2008, however, revealed that the complementarities 
between financial markets, pension funds, workers’ welfare and neoliberal political econ-
omy were sustained only by means of an extreme indebtedness and risky investments 
strategies through which the same workers were sucked into a vortex of speculative eco-
nomic growth. The study of the interrelationship between industrial relations and finan-
cial markets by focusing on their link, i.e., the occupational pension funds, is therefore a 
powerful tool able to contradict the hypothesis of financial determinism. To widen the 
scope of the enquiry to other national contexts in which a private financial institution 
has gradually emerged as a mediator of workers’ need for pensions, means nevertheless to 
change the perspective from which the role of labour organisations in affecting national 
economic policy is usually analysed. This means that the worker organisations involved 
in pension funds management should not be considered as merely passive players during 
the phase of economic financialisation, but rather as fundamental players in restoring 
capitalist accumulation.
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Notes
 1. The potential replacement ratio (at normal retirement age) of the public pension as a 
percentage of final earnings is less than 10 per cent in Iceland, which is four to five times less 
than in other Nordic countries. Iceland currently spends only 2 per cent of GDP on basic and 
supplementary state pensions.
 2. Voluntary pension schemes have not been of great significance in Iceland.
 3. The main implication of this was that only members of a pension fund that had invested in 
the house founding system could get mortgages, and then only if their premium had been 
paid to the pension fund (Baldvinsdóttir, 1998: 139-40). Since this is the only institution 
in Iceland from which a mortgage loan is available, this led to an increase in pension funds 
memberships (SAL-fréttir, 1992).
 4. What tends to happen is that the contribution rate remains relatively stable, but the benefits 
rates at retirement change from time to time to maintain the balance of the fund, with 
the consent of the members (OECD, 1999: 107). For a long time, the Icelandic pension 
system in the private sector was purely in the DC model. From their establishment up to 
1997, no law had been passed protecting a member’s right to even a minimum pension. The 
Occupational Pensions Act passed in 1997 tried to reduce this imbalance against workers 
by targeting a given replacement rate for the occupational plans target, and by providing 
minimum benefit guarantees, equal to 56 per cent of monthly pay, if contributions had been 
paid for 40 years (OECD, 2008: 53-54).
 5. The predominance of the fishing industry in exports is an important structural feature of 
the Icelandic economy. Marine products contributed more than 80 per cent of total export 
earnings until the late-1980s.
6. From the Second World War until the early 1970s, the króna was pegged against or at 
least managed with respect to the currency of some trading partner country or a basket 
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of currencies, but with varying degrees of adjustability and commitment (Guðmundsson, 
2002: 15). After the collapse of Bretton-Woods, the Icelandic exchange rate regime became 
increasingly flexible, and could be characterised as ‘managed floating’.
 7. For most of the nation’s history as a republic, Iceland had the highest labour force 
participation rate and one of the lowest unemployment rates in the OECD (OECD, 1997: 
103). During the period under consideration, the unemployment rate fluctuated between 
0.3 and 1.3 per cent.
 8. Long-term foreign debt as a percentage of GNP passed from 31 in 1981 to 56 per cent in 
1985. In general, debt in foreign currencies increases the production costs of local firms if the 
national currency is devalued.
 9. The first coalition was formed by the right-wing Independent Party (IP) with the reformist 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the agrarian Progressive Party (PP). The second one was 
formed by the SDP, the PP and the left People’s Alliance (PA).
10. Using the ILO report’s words (1989), the government ‘clearly restricted the right of employees 
and worker organisations to engage in free collective bargaining during the term of the 
legislation. … This was the ninth instance of such intervention in ten years.’
11. ASÍ’s leaders argued that the workers had to cooperate with employers in an effort to accept 
wage restraints for the duration of the recession, in the hope that such cooperation could help 
to restructure firms.
12. Until the period of exchange-rate stability beginning in June 1993, the longest period of 
exchange-rate stability of the króna since the early 1970s was from December 1989 to 
November 1992. At the beginning of 1992, the previous trade-weighted basket was replaced 
with a new one composed of the ECU with a weight of 76 per cent, the US dollar with a 
weight of 18 per cent, and the Japanese yen with a weight of 6 per cent. Iceland adopted an 
inflation target and a floating exchange rate in 2001.
13. Between 1995 and 2006, the governments slashed corporate tax rate almost in half, from 33 
to 18 per cent.
14. In the 1990-2006 period, the gross value added in the fishing sector increased by 34 per 
cent in Denmark, 4 in Finland, 20.6 in Norway and 14.3 per cent in Sweden. In contrast, it 
decreased by 1.5 per cent in Iceland.
15. About 90 per cent of Icelandic firms can be classified as non-efficient in the process of 
transforming labour, capital stock and R&D efforts into output in terms of innovations, 
productivity and growth (Oh et al., 2009: 5).
16. Borrowing by banks in foreign currencies was not only used to finance their own investments, 
but also to provide capital to Icelandic companies for expansion, as well as to families for 
household consumption. The result was that the indebtedness of Icelandic corporations 
went from a situation in which they were relatively debt free in the early 1990s, to one in 
which their debts were equal to 277 per cent of their GDP in 2006. And if at the outset of 
the 1980s household debt was around 26 per cent of disposable income and 17 per cent of 
GDP, by the end of 2006, household indebtedness had reached 116 per cent of GDP and 
216 per cent of disposable income. At the same time, due to the small size of the national 
economy, many Icelandic businesses outgrew national borders by setting up branches and 
acquiring other financial institutions in neighbouring countries. Icelandic foreign direct 
investments, which historically have largely been made up of seafood firms, were now 
replaced by the three main Icelandic banks, real estate, and business companies which have 
set up branches abroad in several countries, acquiring foreign financial firms. Between 1998 
and 2005, FDI stock in financial activities went from USD$1m to more than USD$5300m 
(Hermannsdóttir et al., 2007).
17. Quotas could be separated from vessels and transferred as an independent commodity to 
other vessel owners.
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18. With the new system, the winners were the big quota owners, while the losers were the 
fishermen who have been thrown into a market in which only the lowest bidder gets a chance 
to catch fish (Eyþórsson, 1996: 281).
19. According to ASÍ, by making the fisheries more efficient, the system would boost the national 
economy and provide higher and more secure income for fishermen, whereas the bargaining 
position of fishing crews would improve, resulting in higher wages (Árnason, 1992).
20. In a context in which strikes are restricted when a collective agreement is being signed, the 
extension of the validity of contracts made it more difficult to call for strikes. While between 
1976 and 1989 twelve agreements were reached whose duration was 13.1 months on average, 
from 1990 to 2008, only six agreements were signed, with durations longer than 36 months 
on average.
21. Ezio Tarantelli (1978) clearly described monetarism’ effects on the working class: ‘The 
dominant elite structures the labour force. The subject of the history is not anymore 
the labour movement that continually is trying to set out to conquer new rules, but rather 
the ideology of the dominant bloc from whose "health function’" is derived the cooptation 
action of the union in order to obtain its consensus …. At institutional level, [this] paradigm 
laid the ideological base of the income policies, productivity agreements, consultation, etc.’.
22. Since the mid-1980s, ASÍ’s central committee has collectively been in the hands of the 
People’s Alliance, the IP and the SDP. However, the ASÍ leadership was characterised by its 
cooperation with the IP and the SDP against the PA.
23. The number of funds has been falling in recent years due to mergers aimed at improving 
efficiency. They numbered around 90 at the beginning of the 1980s. At the end of 2007, they 
had fallen to 31. The ten largest pension funds held about 80 per cent of the net assets of all 
pension funds in 2007, and the two largest funds accounted for 35 per cent.
24. Since the late-1990s, the general government financial balance has more often been in surplus 
than in deficit. Gross public debt declined from almost 60 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 27 per 
cent in 2005, while the general government financial balance in ratio to GDP passed from 
-4.7 per cent in 1994 to +6.3 per cent in 2006.
25. Although households’ assets reached more than 400 per cent of GDP in 2007, they were 
evenly split between real assets and financial assets – 70 per cent of which were subject either 
to real estate market risk or equity market risk, with the latter risk mainly being indirect 
through pension funds (OECD, 2009: 30).
26. In the Reykjavik area, housing prices reached their apex in 2007, at 126 per cent higher in 
real terms than in 1996 (Sveinsson, 2011: 63).
27. By the end of 2007, roughly a quarter of the ISK1650bn (Icelandic króna) in assets controlled 
by pensions were invested in mortgages indexed to inflation. In the same year, pension funds 
held 43 per cent of the stock of housing bonds.
28. The deregulation in the sector carried out in 1997 potentially contained this risk.
29. In 2007, the nominal short-term interest differential with the USA, the Euro area and Japan 
was 9.3 per cent, 11.1 per cent and 14.5 per cent, respectively. This attracted carry traders 
speculating against ‘uncovered interest parity’.
30. The last collective agreement signed between ASÍ and SÍ at the beginning of May 2011, valid 
for a record length of 3 years, went in the same direction. According to this contract, the 
general wage would rise by 4.25 per cent the first year, by 3.50 the second one, and by 3.25 
per cent the last year. But already in the period June-October 2011, the average inflation rate 
exceeded 5 per cent (Statistics Iceland). What this means is that the real wages of Icelandic 
workers are still under attack. However, since in Iceland the right to strike is restricted when 
a collective agreement is being signed, ASÍ has guaranteed, de facto, a prolonged period of 
social peace. The latter is necessary to keep those ‘wage deflation policies’ required to adjust 
the fiscal deficit for the next several years.
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31. From January to October 2008, net assets for pension payments decreased by 19.13 per cent 
in real terms.
32. Once nationalised, these banks were named respectively Islandsbanki, Arion and New 
Landsbanki. Currently, the first is 95 per cent owned by ISB Holding, a company controlled 
by the old bank’s creditors. The government owns the rest. The second is 87 per cent owned 
by creditors, with the government holding 13 per cent. The last bank was given more time to 
work out a new ownership structure. New Landsbanki is 81.3 per cent owned by Icelandic 
State Financial Investments, a state holding company (Henning, 2011).
33. HFF was not directly funded by the state, but was financed through returns on its own, 
through issuing HFF bonds which were listed on the Icelandic Stock Exchange and through 
service fees from customers.
34. According to the agreement, the interest rate applied is 0.75 per cent for the next 15 years.
35. Hrafn Magnússon, who has headed the pension funds association for 36 of the industry’s 
41 years’ existence, sincerely replied to the question as to whether the pension funds were 
hubristic before the crisis. He said: ‘Yes, I think that they [the pension funds] behaved like 
everyone in Iceland … Everybody thought we were so clever and that we could buy almost 
anything. And the members were very happy to take the good returns although they were 
angry when, after the crisis, their pension decreased’ (Coats, 2011c).
36. In the aftermath of the financial collapse, the unemployment rate skyrocketed to more than 9 
per cent from less than 1 per cent the previous year. The employment rate decreased by more 
than 5 points, and real wages fell by 12.2 per cent. In the meantime, Icelandic workers were 
hit by a vast programme of public spending cutbacks as well as by the increasing of indirect 
taxes. On the political horizon, Iceland was experiencing a vibrant period of social unrest and 
widespread political protests that resulted in the resignation of the government led by the 
Independent Party. Despite this explosive mix, the Icelandic labour market continued to be 
one of the quietest among OECD countries. In 2009, not a single working day was lost due 
to labour disputes (Statistics Iceland, 2011: 101), while in 2010 only public-sector workers 
went on strikes, mainly pilots and mechanics employed by the flag carrier, fire-fighters and 
ambulance drivers.
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